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Many studies emphasize the use of business groups to separate 
ownership and control. Using different proxies, they conclude that 
such structures permit predatory strategies that harm minority 
shareholders. This study differs because it develops a new model of 
leverage that directly measures the degree of expropriation using 
financial statements and by focusing on the consolidation 
perimeter. This deepening methodology offers significant 
advantages as, within the consolidation perimeter, the chain of 
control is detected by accounting standards, and the sources of 
data are official statements that can be verified objectively. The 
paper constructs a mathematical leverage model that relates a 
group's financial structure to its revenue with respect to majority 
shareholders, minority shareholders and lenders. Then, the model 
is applied to analyze 1575 non-finance Italian groups. The results 
show that in Italy, at least within the consolidation perimeter, 
minority shareholders’ funds are on average significantly fewer and 
well paid; nonetheless, the greatest debt leverage allows majority 
shareholders to increase profits and retain earnings. The paper also 
explores the relationship between the holding company and the 
group and the likelihood that we can infer the features of the 
underlying group from those of the holding company, thus 
producing interesting results. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, based on classic studies by Berle and 
Means (1932), studies on the governance of large 
corporations have assumed, for American 
companies, a prevailing situation in which 
ownership is fragmentary and, in the absence of 
large controlling shareholders, that management 
has control.  
In the years that followed, this concept of the 
separation between "ownership" by many small 
shareholders and "control" by management was 
widely found in many studies including Baumol 
(1959), Penrose (1959), Marris (1964), Williamson 
(1964), Galbraith (1967), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and Grossman and Hart (1980). 
The picture painted by Berle and Means 
undoubtedly had great influence on later studies; 
however, a series of empirical results highlights a 
more complex reality.  
In fact, many studies have found modest but 
significant concentrations of ownership (Eisemberg 
1976; Demsetz 1983; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
1988) that occasionally gain majority-voting rights 
(Holderness and Sheehaan 1988). Managers 
themselves seem to be increasingly involved as 
shareholders of the companies they are managing 
(Friend and Lang 1988; Larner 1966; Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan 1999; Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Palia 1999).  
High levels of ownership concentration are also 
found in businesses worldwide, both in 
economically developed and underdeveloped 
nations (La Porta, et al. 1998, 1999). 
The traditional contraposition between 
shareholder-owners and manager-controllers began 
to move gradually to one of two other categories:  
 controlling shareholders, i.e., those 
(occasionally the managers themselves) who hold 
sufficient shares to have control of overall corporate 
resources; 
 minority shareholders who, in return for their 
investment, obtain the right to share in profits but 
are unable to influence the running of the company. 
This separation between ownership and control 
(control-ownership wedge) has been increasingly 
studied by academics, with particular attention 
being paid to so-called "groups with pyramidal 
structure" (Almeida, and Wolfenzon 2004), in which 
the holding company directly owns controlling 
shares in another company that, in turn, holds 
controlling shares in other companies below it. By 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017, Continued - 2 
 
363 
their very nature, these groups tend to emphasize 
the separation between controlling capital held at 
the top of the pyramid and minority shareholder 
capital, which is scattered and fragmented among a 
host of companies.  
 
1.1. The Outline of the Paper 
 
The study begins by identifying two contrasting 
points-of-view in this literature as two different 
frameworks for classifying research performed on 
business groups: 1) predatory view; 2) synergic view, 
and by identifying the hypothesis to test (paragraph 
2).  
Then, I suggest an innovative analytical model 
(paragraph 3). 
In fact, whereas the separation between 
ownership and control is usually identified by (and 
its analysis limited to) the ratio between control 
rights (CR) and cash flow rights (CFR), I concentrate 
on the separation between: 
 the holding company’s capital ownership; 
 the holding company's capital control, 
namely, all of the resources invested in the 
aggregate (capital from the parent company, 
minority shareholders and lenders) as though it 
were a single entity.  
In short, I investigate the phenomenon of 
separation between capital owned and capital 
controlled by the holding company, as found in the 
group's consolidated financial statements, and I 
compare it with the holding company’s financial 
structure.  
The use of consolidated financial statements is 
particularly useful and offers important advantages 
when compared with previous research practices. 
First, the chain of control is not arbitrarily 
determined by the researcher but is performed by 
the groups themselves in accordance with 
accounting standards in the process of drawing up 
the balance sheets. Moreover, the data are public, 
can be verified objectively and are elaborated using 
explicit accounting standards.  
I go on to construct a mathematical model that 
is able to relate a group's financial structure to its 
revenue, with respect to the various elements 
bringing resources—majority shareholders, minority 
shareholders, and lenders (paragraph 4).  
Consequently, I applied this model to compare 
Italian groups and their own holding companies to 
verify the picture offered by previous circumstantial 
research on minority expropriation (predatory view 
and synergic view) (paragraph 5). 
To perform a significant comparison, I focus 
the analysis on 1575 non-finance groups present in 
the AIDA database (Italian component of Bureau van 
Dijk's Amadeus database) in 2014 that, according to 
their separate and consolidated financial 
statements, present only positive equity and income 
for holding companies and majority and minority 
group shareholders and negative income tax. 
I believe that the empirical results are very 
interesting, and I discuss them in paragraph 5. 
In particular, the model highlights an 
enormous variety of combinations in terms of 
resources managed and their remuneration (this 
observation already contradicts the hypothesis of 
systematic expropriation). Underlying this wide 
variety, however, certain trends should be noted, in 
light of previous research.  
On average, the groups make little use of 
minority shareholders’ funds, and their returns tend 
to be higher than group average returns on 
investment and majority return on equities. 
Therefore, I reject the hypothesis of 
generalized expropriation to the detriment of 
minority interests.  
However, a group also has higher debt leverage 
compared with that of his single holding company, 
and leverage appears to be a key element in building 
majority wealth (profits and retained earnings), 
which, however, remains invested in subsidiaries. 
Another interesting result is that, on average, a 
holding appears to pay less tax than subsidiaries do, 
which could explain the propensity of holdings to 
create groups. 
Correlation analyses highlight a close 
relationship between holding company and group 
leverage ratios. These analyses also show that, when 
holdings tend to be in the form of “pure holding 
company”, they have higher leverage (in this case, 
minorities also seem well remunerated), and they 
seem, on average, to dominate groups relatively 
larger, richer and more profitable in comparison to 
their own dimensions. Therefore, I can suppose 
pyramidal structures. 
Regression analyses confirm the close bond 
between holding company leverage ratios and group 
leverage ratios. Therefore, I conclude that by 
analyzing each holding’s indicator, I can infer the 
corresponding group indicator and, thus, I can 
estimate possible group leverage. Conversely, the 
analyses confirm that it is difficult to fix precise 
tendencies with respect to the management of 
minorities, which refutes the hypothesis of 
systematic expropriation. 
Regression analyses also confirm that the 
higher is the similarity of holding to a pure holding 
company, the greater is the use of equity leverage, 
and the analyses confirm the tendency of this type 
of holding to leave more profits and retained 
earnings invested in subsidiaries and to dominate 
more-pyramidal capital structures. 
Section 6 summarizes the findings and offers 
conclusions. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Studies on pyramidal groups are often fragmentary 
and difficult to organize within an integrated 
descriptive model. 
Below, I present the two main lines of thought:  
 studies that view groups as fundamentally 
predatory; 
 studies that view groups as fundamentally 
synergic. 
 
2.1. The Predatory View 
 
As mentioned, the study of the classic agency 
conflicts between ownership and management has 
gradually moved to studying management disputes 
to disputes generated by separation between 
ownership of capital invested by various categories 
of investors (primarily minority shareholders and 
lenders) and control by major shareholders.  
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In this framework, group majority 
shareholders, using small investments, can find and 
wrest control of significant financial resources from 
minorities. Therefore, according to this view, 
 
Hypothesis 1a: I will have high capital leverage 
(E
m
/E
M
). Because the controlling shareholders look to 
their own interests, they tend to expropriate other 
investors by transferring resources and revenues 
outside subsidiaries by involving them in 
unprofitable projects that, nonetheless, offer 
various benefits for majority shareholders (see 
among others Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta, 
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens and Djankow, 
2000, Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003). 
Transferring wealth between a group's 
businesses in the pyramid to the advantage of 
group’s vertex is known as "tunneling," and 
important studies suggest that weak legal protection 
of investors, typical in a civil law country, is an 
important determinant in the expropriation of 
minority shareholders. Then, expropriation is 
misused by same proxies, particularly by market 
value measures, even in those countries in which 
stock markets are underdeveloped. Among these 
countries, I find Italy and many others countries 
with a civil law legal origin (see, among others: 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2000; Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis 2006; Cheung, 
Jing, Rau and Stouraitis 2009). 
Although it is true that the most developed 
financial systems have common law systems, it 
seems unlikely that all other legal systems should 
be behind in terms of investor protection (Cheffins 
1999; Spaventa 2001). It seems more convincing that 
Albert’s paradigm (Albert 1992) centered, rather 
than on the expropriation, on the existence of two 
forms of capitalism: “Rhine capitalism”, dominated 
by banks (stock markets are marginalized) with 
close relationships between companies and 
communities, and “Anglo-Saxon capitalism”, in 
which companies are financed by stock exchanges 
rather than by banks. 
However, were the expropriation hypothesis 
always to be true, the profitability of the group’s 
apex should undoubtedly be higher compared with 
that of subsidiaries in which minority shareholders 
are located. Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 2a:  
 holding company total investment 
profitability (ROA
H
) will be systematically higher 
than group total investment profitability (ROA
G
); 
 group total investment profitability (ROA
G
) 
will be systematically higher than minority 
shareholder investment profitability (ROE
m
); 
 majority shareholder investment profitability 
(ROE
M
) will be systematically higher than minority 
shareholder investment profitability (ROE
m
); 
Many authors associate tunneling with an 
increase in business risk. In fact, the separation 
between ownership and control isolates in part the 
top of the pyramid from all consequences of 
bankruptcy in companies that the top controls 
financially but that are separate legal entities. 
Unscrupulous ultimate owners (UO) could therefore 
undertake risky investments using the activities of 
companies further down the pyramid (Morck, 
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2004). In short, pyramidal 
structures would seem to allow manipulation of 
risks and profits, passing the former on to minority 
shareholders and taking the latter away from them 
(Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). 
Similar predatory behavior can be discerned in 
debt management; majority shareholders also use 
debt leverage to amplify controlled resources. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Debt leverage will be high (D
G
/E
G
) 
It is in the apex’s interest to increase the ratio 
between debt and his invested capital. By so doing, 
 if debt is concentrated in companies lower 
down the pyramid, he has more resources under his 
control and avoids, contemporaneously, additional 
investments or a weakening of his position of 
control (by asking for recapitalization underwritten 
by other partners). The UO, who is less likely to be 
involved in any bankruptcy situations, is, thus, 
encouraged to take higher risks (Du and Dai 2004; 
Shleifer and Visny 1997).  
 if debt is concentrated in the holding 
company itself or in companies it controls, the UO 
can finance the purchase of shares necessary to gain 
control of the lower levels (as, for example, in 
leveraged buyouts). In this case, the need to repay 
the debt contracted for buying control stock might 
result in expropriation of minority shareholders as 
resources, in the form of dividends, are moved from 
subsidiaries to holding companies (the so-called 
“Debt Service Hypothesis”; see Banny, Noret and 
McGowan, 2010; Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 
2002). 
The increased risk should, however, be 
incorporated in terms of higher cost of debt 
financing. As Chen and Sterken (1999) note, it is 
quite plausible that excessive use of debt would 
increase the likelihood of default for the single 
business. This action would thus have a negative 
influence on the cost of credit, with negative 
consequences for the company's value (Myers 1977; 
Nandelstadh and Rosenberg, 2003; Margaritis and 
Psillaki, 2010; Driffield, Mahambare, and Pal, 2001; 
Purnanandam, 2008; Gilson and Villalonga, 2007). 
Hypothesis 4a: The cost of group debt 
financing (interest rate) is systematically higher than 
the cost of holding company debt financing 
 
2.2. The Synergic View 
 
Other studies conclude that the group represents an 
intermediate form between hierarchy and market 
for overcoming agency costs (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2004), being a more efficient structure 
that adds value to its businesses (Leff 1978). 
Primarily, the group replaces markets when the 
latter are inefficient (Kanna and Palepu and 1999(a), 
(b)) and generates risk-opportunity sharing 
mechanisms (Aoki 2001).  
This view is indubitably supported by a certain 
contradiction in results concerning the use of 
pyramidal groups as a means for separating 
ownership from control.  
On the one hand, pyramids are very common 
in countries in which alternative methods are 
available for separating ownership and control (e.g., 
the possibility of dual class shares; see, among 
others, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer 
1999). On the other hand, pyramid structures are 
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often themselves linked by control chains that leave 
no real space for significant separation of ownership 
and control. Many studies from very different 
geographical areas agree on this aspect (among 
others, see Franks and Mayer, 2002; Lefort and 
Walker, 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Valadares and 
Leal, 2000; Bianco, Bianchi, and Enriques, 2001).  
In this framework, the group’s majority 
shareholders do not systematically wrest control of 
significant financial resources from minorities via 
small investments. Therefore, according to this view, 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Capital leverage (E
m
/E
M
) is not 
systematically relevant. 
On the question of systematic expropriation of 
minority shareholders, there is likewise 
contradictory evidence. According to Faccio, Lang 
and Young (2001), subsidiaries of pyramid groups in 
Western Europe on average pay considerably higher 
dividends than do Asian ones. This point does not 
contradict the expropriation thesis of La Porta and 
others, but it places the thesis into context. 
Controlling shareholders in Asia seem to seek 
expropriation. In Europe, conversely, they focus on 
the market value of shares and use the payment of 
generous dividends to minority shareholders to 
build their reputation. However, despite anecdotal 
evidence, there is little direct systematic evidence of 
the specific transactions through which 
expropriation actually occurs. Furthermore, most 
academic studies have attempted to measure 
expropriation indirectly (see, for example, Bertrand, 
Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, (LLSV), 2000a, 2002; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; or Faccio, 
Lang and Young, 2001). Moreover, the literature also 
offers mixed evidence that minority shareholdings 
lose value because of specific expropriation actions 
(see for example, Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; or 
Buysschaert, Deloof and Jegers, 2002). Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  
 holding company total investment 
profitability (ROA
H
) will not be systematically higher 
than group total investment profitability (ROA
G
);  
 group total investment profitability (ROA
G
) 
will not be systematically higher than minority 
shareholder investment profitability (ROE
m
); 
 majority shareholder investment profitability 
(ROE
M
) will not be systematically higher than 
minority shareholder investment profitability 
(ROE
m
). 
Concerning the connection between pyramid 
structure and debt management, many studies 
concentrate on the group ability to create an 
internal capital market with lower agency costs than 
the external one has (Barclay and Smith, 1995; 
Easterwood and Kadapakkam, 1991; Deloof 1998; 
Stein, 1997; Hoshi et al. 1990; Faccio et al. 2001; 
Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Dewaelheyns and Van 
Hulle, 2010). Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Debt leverage will be high (D
G
/E
G
). 
It would appear, therefore, that debt 
management at the group level generally reduce the 
cost of debt financing and, particularly within 
underdeveloped financial markets, overcomes 
asymmetric information and disadvantageous 
agency relationships.  
The group's companies, with better access to 
external credit, can thereby decide to acquire more 
funding than is needed for their own requirements, 
at a lower cost than bank credit generated by 
asymmetric information. They then pass funding on 
within the group to companies able to guarantee 
higher operating revenue (Ghatak and Kali, 2001). 
Intra-group financing can also influence the 
amount of external debt, partly because intra-group 
lending reduces the need for external credit. 
However, such lending also alters relationships with 
other external lenders, for example, by weakening 
their position or increasing their confidence, 
because the benefits deriving from the bankruptcy 
of one company in the group are limited compared 
with the serious negative impact on the reputation 
of the entire group (Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 
2010; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 2000; Bianco and 
Nicodano, 2006). Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The cost of group debt 
financing (interest rate) is not systematically higher 
than the cost of holding company debt financing. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The analysis of pyramidal groups based solely on 
the separation of controlled and owned voting 
rights is very common, but incomplete, such an 
misses fundamental aspects of the financial 
structure and revenue dynamics. As discussed 
below, the same pyramidal organization can 
comprise diverse financial structures, a situation 
only explained by consideration of a fundamental 
element: the relationship existing between resources 
invested by the holding company and those of its 
subsidiaries. 
Let us begin by considering the financial 
structure of a group in which the capital owned by 
its parent company, in the role of majority 
shareholder (UO), is amplified through two different 
means of financing: by minority shareholders 
(equity leverage – EL) and by lenders (debt leverage – 
DL). 
The best instrument at hand for the analysis is 
without doubt the group's consolidated financial 
statement. 
This document offers numerous advantages 
for detailed research. 
First, if the consolidated financial statements 
have been drawn up according to generally accepted 
accounting principles (such as IFRS, ITA GAAP or US 
GAAP), all of the entries are certain to be treated 
homogeneously. Furthermore, as accounting 
principles become increasingly uniform at an 
international level, it is becoming possible to make 
reliable comparisons between different groups and 
countries. 
Second, the accounting principles underlying 
the consolidated financial statement require very 
clearly defined controls of companies included in 
the document, which must present the group as an 
economic entity, i.e., as one single company (see for 
example IFRS 10). This requirement means that this 
"entity" must be shown only in its external 
relationships—any intra-group balances, operations, 
costs and revenues that might distort such a vision 
must be eliminated.  
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In the consolidated statement, with respect to 
the group's equity (E
G
), the following must be 
indicated separately: 
 the quota of non-controlling interests (NCI), 
i.e., that part of a subsidiary's equity that cannot be 
attributed, either directly or indirectly, to a 
controlling interest (E
m
); 
 the quota of controlling interests, i.e., equity 
owned by the controlling interest (E
M
). 
 
3.1. Equity Leverage (EL) 
 
Academics generally call the separation between 
ownership and control the "equity wedge" and 
measure it by comparing control rights (CR) with  
cash flow rights (CFR) (Claessens et al., 2000).  
Due to the effect of the pyramidal structure, in 
which the majority shareholder of a company can, in 
turn, hold a majority of the capital of another 
company (Heitor & Wolfenzon, 2006), CFR and CR 
can differ (Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2004), thus 
creating a wedge between capital owned and capital 
controlled. 
This wedge is important. However,  
 the same researcher chooses subjectively the 
share percentage that permits control; 
 this wedge tracks only control relationships 
rather than patrimonial relationships between 
parent companies and subsidiaries.  
Let us imagine (Figure 1) I have a group 
comprising four companies—A, B, C and D—in 
which holding company A controls the others in 
succession, with a constant percentage of 60%. This 
60% makes A the effective controlling (CR) 
shareholder of B (100%), C (100%) and D (100%). 
Therefore, if I posit that D returned profits of 100, I 
calculate that only 21.6 of these profits would go to 
A (CFR). In fact, only 21.6% of this profit belongs to 
A (60% of 60% of 60% = 21.6). Consequently, CFR will 
be 36% for C (60% of 60%) and 60% for B. 
 
Figure 1. Equity leverage – a stylized example 
 
 
 
Note: Group 1a follows the financial structure shown in Table 1 (part 2) and is therefore a series of empty boxes 
whose aim is to separate ownership from control. According to this view, leverage (EL) could grow indefinitely, 
increasing the number of levels or reducing the percentage of control of one company in the next.  
Group 1b has the same group control chain and consequently the same values in terms of CR:CFR ratios. A 
controls 100% of D (CR
A.D
), and if D had profits of 100, 21.6% of these profits would go to A (CFR
A.D
). Thus, the 
ratio between CR
A.D
 and CFR
A.D 
remains equal to 4.63. However, the structure of the group is hugely different. 
Comparing the assets shows that, in this case, D is 10 times smaller than in the previous case, as is the entire 
subgroup controlled by A. In fact, in this case, the assets controlled with respect to those invested (EL) is equal to 
1.12, with minority shareholders contributing only 0.12.  
Group 1c has the same group control chain and consequently the same values in terms of CR:CFR ratios. Here 
too, A controls 100% of D (CR
A.D
), and if D had profits of 100, 21.6% of these profits would go to A (CFR
A.D
). Thus, 
the ratio between CR
A.D
 and CFR
A.D 
remains equal to 4.63. Company D at the base of the pyramid has the same 
dimensions as group 1a. However, the companies in between are not empty boxes but operating companies, 
each with their own assets. Moreover, having the same structure, in this case greater investments, will be 
necessary, both for controlling and minority shareholders. The proportion of assets owned against those 
invested is equal to 2.20. This value is naturally influenced by the different share in group financing of 
controlling and minority shareholders. The more the value of assets higher up the pyramid increases, the more 
EL increases (as does investment from controlling shareholders). By contrast, EL diminishes when investments 
are made by companies at the base of the pyramid, moving from a situation type 1b (operating assets 
concentrated at the top) to a type 1c group. 
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Many studies suggest measuring the difference 
between ownership and control using the CR/CFR 
ratio. Thus, in the case of A over D, I would have 
100/21.6 = 4.63. This reasoning would suggest a 
separation between revenue rights (CFR) and control 
rights (CR) in the companies situated toward the 
bottom of the pyramid (Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang 2000) because the pyramidal structure allows 
the parent company to assume an amount of control 
that is disproportionate to the value of its shares in 
successive businesses down the pyramid (La Porta, 
et al.). 
For the research, it is significant to observe 
that the same CR/CFR ratio is compatible with very 
different groups. Figure 1 shows in a stylized 
example the same CR/CFR ratio (100/21.6=4.63) but 
three very different groups. 
In 1 a), capital invested by A is 21.6 in a 
pyramidal structure. In fact, I have an apparent 
equity of 217.6 (the sum of the equities of A, B, C 
and D), and I have equity investments owned by 
group companies that appear as financial resources 
for a total of 117.6 but that, as seen, should be 
eliminated to determine the true capital of the 
group. 
The total capital brought to the group by 
minority shareholders is equal to 78.4 (14.4 + 24 
+40), whereas the capital brought by the holding 
company is only 21.6. I therefore deduce that the 
minority brings a majority of the capital. The equity 
leverage, namely, the ratio between group equity 
controlled by majority shareholders (E
G
) and equity 
owned by them (E
M
), will be as follows: 
 
 
100
21,6
=
21,6+ 78,4
21,6
= 1 + 
78,4
21,6
= 4,63  
 
This result is only possible because minority 
shareholders are divided across various assemblies 
of B, C and D companies, in which a majority of 
capital and voting rights belongs to companies from 
the level above, going right up to holding 
company A. 
In other words, the control of a company with 
less than 100% allows leveraging over minority 
shareholders, in other words, using capital that is 
controlled but not owned to control that company's 
investments (CR) completely. 
In 1 b) (Figure 1) capital invested by A is 100, B, 
C, and D are small, equity leverage is 1.12, and 
CR/CFR ratio remains 4.63.  
In 1 c), capital invested by A is 100, as it is also 
for B, C, and D, equity leverage is 2.20, and CR/CFR 
ratio remains 4.63.  
Therefore, traditional evaluation of the 
separation between CRF and CR is an incomplete 
indicator of group financial structure. Therefore, in 
the leverage effect produced by separation within 
group equity, between capital owned by the holding 
company and capital controlled by it (Clemens, 
1950) I will primarily use equity leverage:  
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (1) 
 
In other words, considering all of the equity of 
the group, I measure what part of the capital is 
invested by controlling shareholders (including 
retained earnings) and how much is invested by 
minority shareholders but is actually controlled by 
majority shareholders. 
Therefore, if, as I said, I call E
G
 the group’s 
equity controlled by majority shareholders, with E
M
 
being equity owned by them and E
m 
the equity 
owned by minority shareholders (and given a group 
with n companies E
m 
= ∑ 𝐸𝑥
𝑛
𝑥=1 ), I obtain: 
 
E
G
 =E
M
 +E
m
 (2) 
 
Therefore, EL is calculated as follows: 
 
 
(3) 
 
I consider this indicator particularly important 
to test Hypothesis 1 (H1). 
 
3.2. Debt Leverage (DL) 
 
Considering the entire financial structure of a 
group, it is clear that the investments controlled by 
the top of the pyramid (UO) comprise not only 
minority interest but also capital financed through 
debt (debt wedge). 
Any analysis of this funding – including in the 
context of a group’s economy – must of necessity 
initially consider some key studies of capital 
structure, largely deriving from the famous 1958 
article by Modigliani and Miller (among others, De 
Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Jensen 1986; Myers, 1984; Titman and Wessel, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002). 
However, debt leverage within groups appears 
to have particular characteristics. The subsidiaries 
of a business group are separate legal entities that 
have direct access both to external and to internal 
financing, the latter occasionally being used to shift 
risks and resources within the group's structure (see 
Shin and Stultz 1998; Deloof, 1998; Deloof and 
Jegers, 1999). 
Therefore, decisions concerning a subsidiary's 
capital structure are more likely the result of a 
broader trade-off at the group level between the 
costs and benefits of different sources of finance, 
such as equity internal debt and external debt 
(Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 2010). Groups, by their 
very nature, can reach higher optimal total leverage 
levels than can single companies (Manos et al. 2007, 
Lee et al. 2000; Jung et al. 2009). 
If I consider the group a single entity, but 
external financing is a real debt incurred by the 
"group as a whole", internal debts are the result of a 
"circulatory system". In the latter case, resources 
are: 
 raised externally by the group's companies 
whose superior rating, agency costs, access to 
capital markets, and so forth permit them to obtain 
better terms, then, 
 redistributed internally toward companies 
whose superior production efficiency, agency costs, 
market opportunities, and so forth permit them to 
derive higher operating revenue. 
Here, too, consolidated financial statements 
are indispensable because they show the effective 
debt of the group as a whole, i.e., external debt. 
Although intra-group loans are essential for the 

EG
EM

EM  Em
EM
1
Em
EM
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functioning of the whole, they appear as internal 
transfers that do not affect total real resources. 
If external debt increases the group's available 
resources, then it must widen the gap between 
capital owned and capital controlled (Dematté 1995, 
Zattoni 2006):  
 
Equityowned
Assetscontrolled
LeverageGlobal   (4) 
 
If TA
G 
shows the total group resources and D
G 
its consolidated debt—external debt—then I have 
the following:  
 
TA
G
 = E
M
 + E
m
 + D
G 
(5) 
 
So:  
 
G
G
M
m
G
G
M
m
M
G
G
G
M
m
G
G
M
m
G
G
M
Mm
G
G
M
G
G
G
M
G
M
G
M
m
M
G
E
D
E
E
E
D
E
E
E
TA
else
E
D
E
E
E
D
E
E
E
D
E
EE
E
D
E
D
E
E
E
D
but
E
D
E
E
E
TA













1
:
1
:
1  
(6) 
 
This result is a particularly important indicator 
for measuring the hypothesis H3. 
I can observe that global leverage is calculated 
by the sum of 1 (constant) plus three other 
components: 
 Equity leverage (EL) previously examined E
M
/E
m
 
 Debt leverage (DL) deriving from the 
traditional ratio between D
G
/E
G
 
 Mixed leverage (ML), that is, the financial 
effect of equity leverage on debt leverage 
(E
M
/E
m
)·(D
G
/E
G
). 
 
4. THE MODEL 
 
The next step is to associate the financial structure 
that majority shareholders are able to control 
through their own shares with the profit they are 
able to obtain from the group.  
I indicate with “P
M
“ the group’s profit owned by 
the holding company (according to accounting 
principles, P
M
 corresponds to holding profit plus a 
majority share of subsidiaries’ profits minus 
intercompany profits) and with “E
M
” equity owned 
by the holding company (E
M 
corresponds to holding 
equity plus a majority share of subsidiaries’ retained 
earnings). Therefore, in addition to the total group 
profit rate (ROE
G
=P
G
/E
G
), I have two separate ratios: 
 
ROE
M
=P
M
/E
M 
 
ROE
m
=P
m
/E
m 
(7) 
 
where, in turn, ROE
m
 represents average return 
on equity attributed to minority shareholders in the 
various companies belonging to the group. In fact, 
given a group of n companies,  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑚 =  
∑ 𝑃𝑚𝑥
𝑛
𝑥=1
∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑥
𝑛
𝑥=1
=  
∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑚𝑥∙𝐸𝑚𝑥
𝑛
𝑥=1
∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑥
𝑛
𝑥=1
  (8) 
 
This indicator is particularly important for 
measuring the tunneling hypothesis (H2). Therefore, 
when there is systematic expropriation of minority 
shareholders, ROE
m 
should be significantly less than 
controlling shareholder return on equity (ROE
M
) and 
thus should confirm the predatory theory. Signs 
confirming the synergic theorem should derive from 
the opposite situation. I are aware that I are 
addressing averages; therefore, when there are 
numerous, well-remunerated minority shareholders 
in a company, there might still be a lesser number 
of poorly remunerated shareholders. The present 
study intends to build a unitary model for 
interpreting group dynamics and to test the 
hypothesis of “systematic expropriation”. Therefore, 
I shall concentrate on the interaction between 
overall variables. However, there is no reason why 
this analysis should not be extended to more 
detailed study of heterogeneous situations within 
the group itself.  
Let us now consider more ratios. If I accept the 
most common interpretation of EBIT as Earnings 
Before Interest and Tax, including Operating and 
Non-Operating Income2 (revenue minus expenses), I 
have the following: 
 
 EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) (EBIT) 
(-) Interest Expenses, net (I) 
 EBT (Earnings Before Taxes) (EBT) 
(-) Income Tax Expense (T) 
(=) Net Profit (P) 
 
I can therefore calculate, first, the ROA
G
. In 
practice, this ratio can be calculated in many ways. I 
shall use the following 
 
ROA
G
=EBIT
G
/A
G 
(9) 
 
Here, also, I have an average return. The 
considerations expressed above also apply here. In 
addition to corporations investing vast assets with 
satisfactory returns, there might be, for example, 
smaller corporations exploring new markets with 
higher or lower profits but that are in any case 
useful to the group's economy (“scouting”).  
If I indicate the total cost of borrowing money 
as I
G
 and the total cost of external debt as D
G
, I can 
show the average cost of debt as i
G
: 
 
i
G
=I
G
/D
G 
(10) 
 
This result is an average cost. The capacity of 
minimizing this indicator demonstrates the group's 
ability to obtain credit using its corporations that, 
for various reasons, are able to reduce borrowing 
cost. These funds will then be redirected, in intra-
group loans, toward those companies that are able 
to derive from them more operating revenue. 
Finally, t
G 
is taxation (T
G
) on earnings before 
taxes (EBT
G
):  
 
t
G
 = T
G
/EBT
G 
(11) 
 
Again, I have an average cost because t
G 
represents the sum of taxes on the sum EBT. 
                                                          
2. In Italy, this value is often associated with the MON (net operating margin) 
or RO (operating revenue), but the concept is not the same. In addition to 
components of operating revenue, EBIT includes costs and revenues from 
additional sources (e.g., residential real estate for a manufacturing company) 
and revenues from so-called active asset management. 
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This variable is influenced by a number of 
factors that produce a different index from one 
group to another. 
To begin with, I should emphasize that a group 
consists of separate legal entities that are often also 
separate for taxation purposes. The same EBT might 
be distributed differently among corporations or, 
within a different corporation, might have a 
different composition.  
Furthermore, given the same EBT, some 
corporations could be making a profit and some, a 
loss, but not all countries allow offsetting profits 
against losses. In the latter case, it might be 
expected that a need to reduce the effect of taxation 
might lead to tunneling directed not against 
minority shareholders but rather to redistribute 
taxable amounts when fiscal law does not allow 
profit/loss compensation.  
Finally, groups tend by their very nature to be 
cross-border. Therefore, another possible motive of 
differentiation in t
G
 is the localization of 
corporations in countries with varying tax laws. 
By developing the mathematical process, I can 
set up a single equation for the various components 
outlined (see Appendix 1): 
 
     GGG
G
G
M
m
G
mG
M
m
GG
G
G
GM tiROA
E
D
E
E
t
ROEROA
E
E
iROA
E
D
ROAROE 

















 1
1
1
 
(12) 
 
In synthesis, I can maintain that the holding 
company's revenue ROE
M
 is calculated by the sum of 
 
 Return On Asset 
GROA
 
 
 Debt Leverage Effect (DLE) 
𝐷𝐺
𝐸𝐺
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐺 − 𝑖𝐺)  (13) 
 
calculated by the product of debt leverage (D
G
/E
G
) 
and debt cost gap. This is an important indicator to 
test the group's role in risk management and to 
reduce the cost of external financing (debt) (H4): 
 
 Equity Leverage Effect (ELE) 
 
 
 
 
(14) 
 
calculated by the product of equity leverage (E
m
/E
M
)  
and share cost gap, i.e., the difference between ROA
G
 
and the group average returns on equity invested by 
minority shareholders, realigned (1/(1-t
G
)) to 
consider the non-tax-deductible nature of dividends. 
I also believe that this indicator is very important 
for measuring the tunneling hypothesis (H2): 
 
 Mixed Leverage Effect (MLE) 
 
 (15) 
 
calculated by the product of equity leverage, debt 
leverage and debt cost gap 
 
 Tax Effects  
 
 Gt1  
(16) 
  
Therefore, if I compare group leverage with 
holding leverage, I have the following: 
 
(17) 
where: M= majority; m= minority; G= group; H=holding. 
 
I also consider other ratios to capture the 
relationship between a holding company and its 
groups to highlight their dimensions and to verify 
the pyramidal structure underlying holdings. 
Therefore, I also consider: 
 Profits (P
M
/P
H
); 
 Equities (E
M
/E
H
);  
 Assets (A
G
/A
H
);  
 Debts (D
G
/D
H
);  
 Employers (emp
G
/emp
H
). 
For holding company, I also calculate the 
following: 
 Investment in subsidiaries over assets 
(ISb
H
/A
H
); this indicator is important to understand 
whether the holding company manages only share 
activities (pure holding company) or has other 
assets and manages operational activities (operating 
holding company).  
 Sum of credits and debt loan to subsidiaries 
on investment in subsidiaries (CD
H
/ISb
H
) to estimate 
the degree of financial integration. 
 Number of registered subsidiaries (Sub
H
).  
 Legal form (two dummy variables: “SpaVsSrl” 
and “SpaVsOthers”; thus, when holding is a “Spa”, 
both indicators =0; when holding is a Srl, “SpaVsSrl” 
=1 and “SpaVsOthers” = 0; conversely, “SpaVsSrl” =0 
and “SpaVsOthers” = 1 when holding has another 
legal form) and listing on the stock exchange 
(dummy variable “List”= 1 when holding is listed). 
(See Apendix 2). 
I use sample data of 1,575 non-finance groups 
present in the AIDA database (Italian component of 










G
mG
M
m
t
ROEROA
E
E
1
1
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M
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E
D
E
E
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Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database) in 2014 that, 
according to their separate and consolidated 
financial statements, present only positive equity 
and income for a holding company and majority 
and minority group shareholders and negative 
income tax (gain) to: 
1) Compare the holding company and its own 
group to test the predatory and synergic 
hypotheses. 
2) Correlate the holding company’s ratios 
between them, the group’s ratios between them and 
the holding company’s and group’s ratios between 
them to verify the theoretical and empirical 
relationships. 
3) Evaluate whether it is possible to infer 
group features from holding features using least 
squares regression models.  
 
 
(18) 
 
 
The group features that I consider are the 
group leverage ratios (10 indicators), rise of profits 
(P
M
/P
H
), equities (E
M
/E
H
), assets (A
G
/A
H
) and 
employees (empG/empH). 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the values of EM and PM. 
EM is the group majority equity owned by the 
holding company and corresponds to holding equity 
plus the majority share of subsidiary retained 
earnings. The group majority profit P
M
 is group 
profit owned by the holding company and 
corresponds to holding profit plus the majority 
share of subsidiary profits minus intercompany 
profits. Therefore, comparing E
M
 and E
H 
highlights 
the tendency of a holding company to attract or, 
instead, to leave gains in subsidiaries in the form of 
retained earnings. A comparison between P
M
 and P
H
 
highlights the tendency of a holding company to 
attract or not to attract a group’s profit from 
subsidiaries. 
 
Table of abbreviations 
 
A
G,H
 Total assets (group and holding company) 
CD
H
 Sum of credits and debts of holding companies vs. subsidiaries  
D
G,H
 Debts (group and holding company) 
DLE
G,H
 Debt leverage effect (D/E*(ROA-i)) (group and holding company) 
ELE
G
 Equity leverage effect (E
m
/E
M
*(ROA-ROEt
m
)) (group) 
E
M,m.H
 Equities (group majority or minority shareholders and holding company) 
emp
G,H
 Employees (group and holding company) 
i
G,H
 Interest rate (interest/debts) (group and holding company) 
ISb
H
 Investments in share or stake in subsidiaries  
Listed Spa Number; only S.p.As can be listed on Italian stock exchanges 
LnA Total assets (natural logarithm)  
MLE
G
 Mixed leverage effect (D/E* E
m
/E
M
 *(ROA-i)) (group) 
Others 
Includes: Sapa (Società in accomandita per azioni) a hybrid form of an Italian company (fairly uncommon) partially 
limited by shares that involves two different categories of shareholders, some with and some without limited 
liability (“accomandanti” are standard shareholders who have limited liability when managing shareholders; 
“accomandatari” are shareholders who have full liability). “Società cooperative” (or ‘coop’) is a particular Italian 
business organization owned and run by individuals for their mutual benefit and “società consortili”.  
P
M.H
 Profits (group majority shareholders and holding companies) 
ROA
G,H
 Return on assets (Ebit/A) (group and holding company) 
ROE
M,m, H
 Return on equity (P/E) (group majority or minority shareholders and holding company) 
ROEt
m
 
Returns on equity invested by minority shareholders, realigned to consider the non-tax-deductible nature of 
dividends (P/E * 1/(1-t)) 
Spa 
Società per azioni: Italian limited liability companies whose capital is divided into shares (called ‘azioni’) and 
whose members (shareholders) are only liable for its debts within the limits of the capital stock. The minimum 
required starting capital for an S.p.A. is € 120,000. 
Srl 
(Società a responsabilità limitata): Italian limited liability company whose capital is divided into stakes (called 
‘quote’) and whose members are only liable for its debts within the limits of the company assets. The minimum 
required starting capital for an S.r.l. is € 10,000. 
sub
H
 Number of subsidiaries 
t
G,H
 Tax rate (tax/earnings before taxes) (group and holding company) 
 
Table 1. Holding 
 
Legal form N. 
Spa 1,118 
Srl 363 
Others 93 
Listed Spa 71 
Group 
features 
 
=  β
0 
+ β
1
ROA
H 
+ β
2 
i + β
3 
(D
H
/E
H
) + β
 4 
DLE
H 
+ β
 5 
(1-t
H
) + β
 6 
(ISb
H
/A
H
) + β
 7 
CD
H
/A
H
 + 
β
 8 
(SpaVsSrl)+ β
 9 
(SpaVsOth)+ β
 10 
List + β
 11 
Sub
H
+ β
 12 
LnA
H
 + β
 13 
emp
H
 +  
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Table 2. Group & Holding 
 
Ratio Mean Median Std. Data sample =1.575 
 Group Holding Group Holding Group Holding WilcoxonZ Sign. 
A
G,H
/1,000 452,475 274,746 80,880 50,609 4,792,602 2,635,107 -33.65 ** 
D
G,H
/1,000 305,896 159,475 46,203 24,213 4,117,602 1,946,410 -33.36 ** 
E
M.H
/1,000 136,606 116,845 27,645 22,129 1,121,084 1,081,452 -24.30 ** 
E
m
/1,000 10,849  156  112,889    
P
M.H
/1,000 9,682 7,084 2,055 1,437 49,556 34,392 -18.95 ** 
P
m
/1,000 1,198 7,084 14  16,120    
emp
G,H
 922 411 237 84 4,686 3,775 -32.49 ** 
sub
H 
 10.72  6  16.77   
ISb
H
/A
H
  0.25  0.13  0.28   
Note: **=sign<0.01 
 
E
M
 and P
M
 are, on average, higher than holding 
equity E
H
 and profit P
M
. The increase is not on 
average very high, but it is statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon Z test) and provides us a preliminary 
indication consistent with H1b; the majority appear 
not to systematically expropriate the subsidiaries; 
rather, they leave part of their wealth invested in the 
body of the group. However, the group minority 
equity E
m
 is small; thus, the interest in expropriating 
group members is also small.  
Conversely, comparing the rise of debt from 
holding to group (D
G,H
), it is clearly the group that, 
on average, finances the increased investments from 
the holding to the group (A
GH
). 
 
Table 3. Group/Holding 
 
Ratio Mean Median Std. Sample groups 
A
G
/A
H
 2.47 1.30 3.47 1575 
D
G
/D
H
 70.76 1.40 785.70 1575 
E
M
/E
H
 1.67 1.09 8.67 1575 
E
m
/E
H
 0.21 0.01 1.02 1575 
P
M
/P
H
 6.29 1.22 39.83 1575 
emp
G
/emp
H
 27.83 1.56 182.7 1322 
Table 3 presents the same comparison for each 
group holding by using ratios. I can observe the great  
variability in D
G
/D
H
 due to the effect of debt leverage 
and equity leverage between group and holding: 
 
 
(19) 
 
Table 4. Leverage 
 
 Mean Median Std. Data sample =1.575 
Ratio Group Holding Group Holding Group Holding WilcoxonZ Sign. 
ROE
M.H
 9.59% 9.31% 7.86% 6.40% 7.53% 8.98% -6.26 ** 
ROA
G.H
 7.04% 6.98% 5.69% 5.00% 4.78% 6.30% -7.65 ** 
D
G.H
/E
G.H
 2.83 2.10 1.74 1.13 4.1 3.48 -22.01 ** 
ROA 
G.H
 7.08% 6.98% 5.59% 5.00% 4.78% 6.30% -7.65 ** 
i 
G.H
 1.59% 1.68% 1.41% 1.20% 1.21% 2.79% -6.21 ** 
(ROA
 G.H
 -i
 G.H
) 5.46% 5.36% 3.95% 3.20% 5.00% 6.94% -6.56 ** 
DLE 
G.H
 9.80% 6.62% 6.82% 3.70% 10.29% 8.60% -22.94 ** 
E
m
/E
M
 0.1 
 
0.01 
 
0.28  
  
ROA 
G
 7.04% 
 
5.69% 
 
4.78%  -12.48 ** 
ROEt
m
 27.77% 
 
7.32% 
 
165.25%  
 
(ROA
 G
-ROEt
m
) -20.71%  -2.24  164.19%    
ELE 
G
 -1.48% 
 
-0.01% 
 
10.85%  
  
D
 G
/E 
G
 2.83 
 
1.74 
 
4.1  
  
E
m
/E
M
 0.10 
 
0.01 
 
0.28  
  
ROA 
G
 7.08% 
 
5.59% 
 
4.78%  
  
i 
G
 1.59% 
 
1.41% 
 
1.21%  
  
MLE
G
 1.05% 
 
0.03% 
 
8.01% 
   
1-t 
G.H
 56% 64% 60% 66% 17% 24% -17.97 ** 
M=majority; m=minority; G=group; H=holding   ROE*
m
= ROE
m
 (1/1-t)        **=sign<0.01 
H
m
H
M
H
G
E
E
E
E
E
E

H
G
H
H
G
G
H
G
E
E
E
D
E
D
D
D

H
G
H
H
G
G
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G
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E
E
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E
D
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
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1
1
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Table 4 compares group leverage and holding 
company leverage. 
Because ROE equals the ratio between profit (P) 
and equity (E), 
-ROE
H
 compare only head-family profit (P
H
) and 
equity (E
H
)  
-ROE
M
 compare majority interest exhibited in a 
group’s consolidated financial statement, namely, 
group profits owned by majority shareholders (P
M
) 
and group equity owned by majority shareholders 
(E
M
).  
I can observe that for both the mean and the 
median, majority shareholder group ROE
M
 (9.59%) is 
slightly higher (but statistically significant) than 
holding ROE
H
 (9.31%) and that distributions are 
positively skewed (however, high standard 
deviations for many indicators show various types 
of equilibriums). 
Moreover, group ROA
G
 is slightly higher than 
holding ROA
H
 (mean, 7.04% and 6.98%; median 5.69% 
and 5.00%). This point also seems to contradict the 
hypothesis of expropriation (H2) to the detriment of 
minority interests. In fact, as attested by previous 
studies, tunneling should lead to an increase in 
ROA
H
 holding, which should be greater than the 
average of the group ROE
M
. 
Group debt leverage (D
G
/E
G
 = 2.83) is 
remarkably higher than holding debt leverage (D
H
/E
H
 
= 2.10) and suggests that groups are better able to 
call on external financing than are the holding 
individual companies. I must also consider that 
groups overlap equities of single firms and that 
group debt leverage is consequently higher than the 
mean of group single firms, based on an illusory 
equity. 
Interest rate (i
G,H
) is comparable. The risk, 
therefore, does not appear to be systematically 
higher in the layers underlying the group's holding 
company. Therefore, the hypothesis of an increased 
risk of the group with respect to the holding (H4) is 
not supported. The debt leverage effect 
(DLE=D/E(ROA-i)) is very important (more than 
minority expropriation) in making up a majority 
shareholders group’s returns (DLE
G
= 9,80%; 
DLE
H
=6,62%). 
Equity leverage E
m
/E
M
 (mean=0.1; median 0.01) 
shows that the contribution of minority 
shareholders to a majority global leverage (TA
G
/E
M
= 
1 + (D
G
/E
G
) + (E
m
/E
M
) + (E
m
/E
M
 D
G
/E
G
)) is not 
substantial. This point contradicts the predatory 
view (H2). 
Moreover, remuneration ROEt
m
 appears to 
contradict the predatory view (H2). The mean value 
is 27.77%, considerably higher than ROA
G
 (7.08%) 
and ROE
M
 (9.59%). Therefore, the minority 
shareholder equities are few and very well 
remunerated (ROEt
m
), and the difference with group 
ROA
G
 is relevant and statistically significant.  
Low equity leverage (EL) causes the negative 
equity leverage effect (ELE= E
m
/E
M
 (ROA
G
-ROEt
m
) to be 
feeble (-1.48%); the effect is partially balanced by the 
mixed leverage effect (MLE= D
G
/E
G
 E
m
/E
M
 (ROA
G
-i
G
) = 
1.05) 
Another interesting result is that the tax effect 
ratio (1-t) shows a lower value for groups than for 
holdings (respectively, 56% and 64%, so t
G
=44%, t
H
= 
36%). Therefore, on average, holdings seem to pay 
less tax than do subsidiaries. This result could 
explain the propensity on the part of holdings to 
create groups. 
However, this distribution leads us to conclude 
that the group structure so common in Italy is not 
due to a need to gather resources from minority 
shareholders, much less to a desire for large-scale 
expropriation. I can only speculate concerning other 
reasons such as reduction or containment of the 
risk of bankruptcy for the entire entity or an 
attempt to optimize dimensions or legal firm 
localization to obtain benefits (e.g., in terms of labor 
relations and taxation).  
Correlation tables highlight a close relationship 
between holding company (Table 5), group (Table 6) 
and holding company-group leverage ratios (Table 7, 
left upper quadrant). Therefore, construction of 
majority shareholder profitability (ROE
M
 and ROE
H
) 
seems particularly associated with ROA and the 
debt leverage effect (DLE). 
 
Table 5. Holding-Holding 
 
  Holding company 
  ROE
H
 ROA
H
 i
H
 D
H
/E
H
 DLE
H
 1-t
H
 
 
ISb
H
/A
H
 CD
H
/A
H
 Sub
H
 LnA
H
 emp
H
 
H
o
ld
in
g
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
ROE
H
 
1 .716** -.097** 0.004 .552** .305** -.057** 0.027 -0.023 -0.023 0.033 
. 0 0 0.806 0 0 0.001 0.158 0.177 0.222 0.051 
ROA
H
 
.716** 1 -0.014 -.152** .363** .259** -0.031 -0.001 -0.013 -0.02 .036* 
0 . 0.4 0 0 0 0.072 0.945 0.443 0.276 0.038 
i
H
 
-.097** -0.014 1 .166** -.060** -.131** -0.01 .096** .089** .128** .087** 
0 0.4 . 0 0 0 0.563 0 0 0 0 
D
H
/E
H
 
0.004 -.152** .166** 1 .396** -.377** -.341** .112** -0.009 .115** .293** 
0.806 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.61 0 0 
DLE
H
 
.552** .363** -.060** .396** 1 -.078** -.283** .051** -.048** 0.035 .241** 
0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.007 0.006 0.057 0 
1-t
H
 
.305** .259** -.131** -.377** -.078** 1 .346** 0.019 .059** -.064** -.287** 
0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0.321 0.001 0.001 0 
   
ISb
H
/A
H
 
-.057** -0.031 -0.01 -.341** -.283** .346**  1 .096** .133** -.135** -.329** 
0.001 0.072 0.563 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 
CD
H
/A
H
 
0.027 -0.001 .096** .112** .051** 0.019 .096** 1 .254** .058** 0.02 
0.158 0.945 0 0 0.007 0.321 0 . 0 0.005 0.304 
Sub
H
 
-0.023 -0.013 .089** -0.009 -.048** .059** .133** .254** 1 .334** .196** 
0.177 0.443 0 0.61 0.006 0.001 0 0 . 0 0 
LnA
H
 
-0.023 -0.02 .128** .115** 0.035 -.064** -.135** .058** .334** 1 .485** 
0.222 0.276 0 0 0.057 0.001 0 0.005 0 . 0 
emp
H
 
0.033 .036* .087** .293** .241** -.287** -.329** 0.02 .196** .485** 1 
0.051 0.038 0 0 0 0 0 0.304 0 0 . 
Note: Tau_b di Kendall; Data sample 1575; sign<0.01=**; sign <0.05=* (2-tailed). 
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Table 6. Group-Group 
 
  Group 
  ROE
M
 ROA
G
 i
G
 D
G
/E
G
 DLE
G
 1-t
G
  ROEt
m
 E
m
/E
M
 ELE
G
 MLE
G
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
ROE
M
 
1 .625** -.107** -0.016 .605** .389** .054** -0.012 0.015 .105** 
. 0 0 0.332 0 0 0.002 0.496 0.386 0 
ROA
G
 
.625** 1 -.038* -.268** .345** .361** .097** 0.009 -0.015 .084** 
0 . 0.024 0 0 0 0 0.593 0.381 0 
i
G
 
-.107** -.038* 1 .207** -.062** -.118** -0.004 .052** -0.018 0.021 
0 0.024 . 0 0 0 0.838 0.003 0.304 0.221 
D
G
/E
G
 
-0.016 -.268** .207** 1 .316** -.293** -0.006 0.019 -.053** .073** 
0.332 0 0 . 0 0 0.75 0.284 0.002 0 
DLE
G
 
.605** .345** -.062** .316** 1 .063** .089** 0.008 -.065** .152** 
0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.637 0 0 
1-t
G
 
.389** .361** -.118** -.293** .063** 1 0.011 0.025 0.026 .050** 
0 0 0 0 0 . 0.544 0.162 0.135 0.004 
   
ROEt
m
 
.054** .097** -0.004 -0.006 .089** 0.011  1 .450** -.550** .495** 
0.002 0 0.838 0.75 0 0.544 . 0 0 0 
E
m
/E
M
 
-0.012 0.009 .052** 0.019 0.008 0.025 .450** 1 -.567** .846** 
0.496 0.593 0.003 0.284 0.637 0.162 0 . 0 0 
ELE
G
 
0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -.053** -.065** 0.026 -.550** -.567** 1 -.574** 
0.386 0.381 0.304 0.002 0 0.135 0 0 . 0 
MLE
G
 
.105** .084** 0.021 .073** .152** .050** .495** .846** -.574** 1 
0 0 0.221 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 . 
Note: Tau_b di Kendall; Data sample 1575; sign<0.01=**; sign <0.05=* (2-tailed) 
 
Table 7. Holding-Group 
 
  Holding company 
  ROE
H
 ROA
H
 i
H
 D
H
/E
H
 DLE
H
 1-t
H
  ISb
H
/A
H
 CD
H
/A
H
 Sub
H
 LnA
H
 emp
H
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
ROE
M
 
.578** .468** -.086** 0.005 .419** .188** -0.016 .053** -0.008 -.061** 0.001 
0 0 0 0.763 0 0 0.357 0.005 0.626 0.001 0.955 
ROA
G
 
.481** .600** -.040* -.189** .243** .224** .042* 0.03 0.026 -0.03 -0.004 
0 0 0.019 0 0 0 0.013 0.113 0.128 0.105 0.801 
i
G
 
-.125** -.060** .572** .133** -.099** -.083** .070** .096** .089** .066** 0.019 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.259 
D
G
/E
G
 
-.066** -.203** .167** .586** .194** -.230** -.076** .093** -0.031 -.057** .037* 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.002 0.031 
DLE
G
 
.413** .273** -.035* .247** .532** 0.006 -.050** .083** -0.029 -.109** 0.03 
0 0 0.041 0 0 0.73 0.003 0 0.092 0 0.077 
1-t
G
 
.271** .257** -.093** -.197** .064** .360** 0.032 -0.007 .049** .051** -.034* 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.057 0.704 0.004 0.006 0.045 
   
ROEt
m
 
.035* .045* 0.016 -.052** -0.012 .073** 
 
.064** .099** .191** -0.017 -0.025 
0.049 0.011 0.359 0.003 0.493 0 0 0 0 0.385 0.168 
E
m
/E
M
 
-0.032 -0.028 0.016 -.107** -.116** .141** .231** .080** .162** -.113** -.171** 
0.07 0.109 0.365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ELE
G
 
0.024 0.032 -0.011 .056** .071** -.098** -.130** -0.038 -.128** .080** .110** 
0.167 0.066 0.527 0.001 0 0 0 0.051 0 0 0 
MLE
G
 
.047** 0.029 -0.006 -.053** -0.01 .134** .199** .102** .164** -.121** -.139** 
0.008 0.099 0.752 0.002 0.563 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
P
M
/P
H
 
-.249** -.214** -0.018 -.078** -.213** -.062** 
 
.155** .059** 0.009 -.154** -.169** 
0 0 0.291 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.593 0 0 
E
M
/E
H
 
.067** .064** -.104** -.160** -.066** .206** .193** .092** 0.021 -.221** -.228** 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 
D
G
/D
H
 
-.055** -0.015 -.047** -.413** -.321** .337** .552** .073** .046** -.279** -.444** 
0.001 0.384 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 
A
G
/A
H
 
-0.024 -0.009 -.044** -.300** -.241** .317** .511** .127** .049** -.310** -.424** 
0.16 0.613 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0 0 
emp
G
/emp
H
 
-0.027 -0.014 .042* -.201** -.174** .241** .398** .250** .158** -.068** -.273** 
0.142 0.437 0.026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 
Note: Tau_b di Kendall; Data sample 1575 (except emp
G
/emp
H
 1322); sign<0.01=**; sign <0.05=* (2-tailed) 
 
The debt leverage (D/E) correlations in Table 5 
and 6 are interesting. I observe that the increase of 
D/E is associated with the reduction of ROA and the 
increase in interest and is consistent with the 
Modigliani-Miller model. HoIver, despite this double 
variation, the difference betIen “ROA” and “i” 
remains positive, and I observe an increase in the 
debt leverage effect (DLE). 
For holding companies (Table 5), I also observe 
that the higher is the similarity with pure holding 
companies  (high ISb
H
/A
H
 ratio), the lower is their  
debt leverage (D
H
/E
H
), debt leverage effect (DLE
H
) and 
taxation (higher 1-t
H
), the more are subsidiaries 
(Sub
H
) and the less are their investments (LnA
H
) and 
employees (emp
H
). Holding companies that have 
more subsidiaries (Sub
H
) have more intercompany 
loans and debts (CD
H
/A
H
), investments (LnA
H
) and 
employees (emp
H
); holding companies that have 
higher investments (LnA
H
) have higher interest rate 
(i
H
), debt leverage (D
H
/E
H
), subsidiaries (Sub
H
) and 
more employees (emp
H
). 
For groups (Table 6), I observe similar results 
for debt-leverage effects (DLE
G
) but also the feeble 
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equity leverage effect (ELE
G
) in the construction of 
majority shareholder profitability (ROE
M
) (H2).  
I can verify that the higher is equity leverage 
(E
m
/E
M
) the higher is minority shareholder 
profitability (ROEt
m
) and so the lower is equity 
leverage effect (ELE
G
). Evidently this contradicts the 
predatory view (H2). However, the mixed-leverage 
effect (MLE
G
) is higher because of the combined 
effect of debt leverage (D
G
/E
G
) and equity leverage 
(ELE
G
). 
The relationship between holding companies 
and groups (Table 7) highlights other interesting 
correlations, in addition to the above-mentioned 
high correlations between holding company and 
group leverage ratios (left upper quadrant).  
More-indebted holding companies (left middle 
quadrant; higher D
H
/E
H
) own groups with lower 
equity leverage (E
m
/E
M
).  
Furthermore, the most-profitable holding 
companies (left lower quadrant; ROE
H
, ROA
H
, DLE
H
) 
tend to attract profits from subsidiaries (low P
M
/P
H
), 
and more indebted holding companies (higher 
D
H
/E
H
) tend to dominate groups in which the 
pyramidal structure of investment is less 
pronounced (lower A
G
/A
H
 and emp
G
/emp
H
). 
The right upper quadrant shows, in particular, 
that smaller holding companies (lower LnA
H
) present 
a higher group debt-leverage effect (DLE
G
). 
Right middle quadrant indicators show an 
interesting correlation concerning equity leverage 
effect (ELE
G
) and, consequently, for the holding 
companies and groups that employ minority 
shareholders in their structure. Therefore, I observe 
that holdings tending toward the form of  
pure holding companies (high ISb
H
/A
H
 ratio) have 
higher equity leverage (E
m
/E
M
) and that this is 
consistent with the stylized example of pyramidal 
structure 1a of Figure 1. Minorities seem well 
remunerated (ROEt
m
>ROA
G
  negative ELE
G
) (H2). 
Moreover, number of subsidiaries (Sub
H
) appears to 
have a negative effect on ELE
G
. Conversely, the 
correlation between a holding’s employees and ELE
G
 
is positive. MLE
G
’s values condense too many 
variables and opposite movements; therefore, I refer 
to the regression analysis. 
The right lower quadrant displays others 
interesting relationships about holding companies 
and group structure. Positive correlations between 
ISb
H
/A
H
 ratio values and P
M
/P
H
, E
M
/E
H
, D
G
/D
H
, A
G
/A
H
, 
emp
G
/emp
H
 lead us to believe that pure holding 
companies seem, on overage, to dominate relatively 
larger groups (A
G
/A
H
; Emp
G
/Emp
H
,
 
which is
 
also 
consistent with the stylized example of pyramidal 
structure 1a in Table 1) that are richer (E
M
/E
H
) and 
more profitable (P
M
/P
H
) in comparison to their own 
dimensions. Therefore, I can suppose pyramidal 
structures. Conversely, larger holding companies 
(LnA
H
 and emp
H
) seem to dominate small groups in 
comparison to their own dimensions. 
The final analysis I propose is to estimate a 
model to trace from the characteristics of the 
holding company the characteristics of the 
controlled group. Tables 8 and 9 report the results 
of ordinary least squares regressions (Note: I test 
other model, but ROA
G
-ROEt
m
 not significant (R2 
0.230; sign 0,981), ROE
M
-ROEt
m
 not significant (R2 
0.004; sign 0.966).  
 
Table 8. Holding company. Part I β coefficients  
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Table 9. Holding company. Part II b coefficient 
 
 
A group's economy appears to be significantly 
influenced by its parent company’s economy. 
 Regr. 1 ROE
M
 (R2 0.576); Regr. 2 ROA
G
 (R2 
0.590); Regr. 3 i
G
 (R2 0.203); Regr. 4 D
G
/E
G
 (R2 0.729); 
Regr. 5 DLE
G
 (R2 0.568); and Regr. 6 (1-t
G
) (R2 0.354) 
confirm the close bond between holding company 
leverage ratios and group leverage ratios. Therefore, 
by analyzing each holding’s indicator (ROA
H
, i
H
, 
DLE
H
, 1-t
H
—and hence ROE
H
, excluded to reduce 
collinearity), I can infer the corresponding group’s 
indicator and thus estimate possible group leverage. 
 Regr. 7 (R2 0.003 not-significant); Regr. 9 (R2 
0.063) and Regr. 10 (R2 0.066) conversely confirm 
that is difficult to fix precise tendencies with 
respect to the management of minorities. This 
refutes the hypothesis of systematic expropriation 
(H2). Regr. 8 (R2 0.159) confirm, however, that the 
greater is the similarity with pure holding 
companies (high ISb
H
/A
H
 ratio), the greater is the use 
of equity leverage (E
m
/E
M
). 
 Regr. 11 (R2 0.094) and Regr. 12 (R2 0.278) 
confirm the tendency of pure holding companies 
(high ISb
H
/A
H
 ratio) to leave more profit (P
M
/P
H
) and 
more retained earnings (E
M
/E
H
) invested in 
subsidiaries (and this tendency contradicts the 
expropriation hypothesis H2). Regr. 13 (R2 0.370) 
and Regr. 14 (R2 0.117) also confirm that that 
holdings tending toward the form of pure holding 
companies tend to dominate more-pyramidal capital 
structures. This result is consistent with stylized 
example of pyramidal structure 1a of Figure 1 but 
does not mean that there are expropriations (in fact, 
ELE
G
 is negative).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study contributes to the debate on business 
groups and pursues the topic from several points of 
view. 
First, the study organizes the literature into 
two opposing views, predatory and synergic, and 
bases its structure on this  division. However, it 
differs from previous research by suggesting a new 
analytical methodology to test the likelihood of 
these two views. 
Although separation between ownership and 
control is typically identified with (and its analysis 
limited to) the ratio between control rights (CR) and 
cash flow rights (CFR), I concentrated instead on the 
separation between “what” holding company owns 
and controls (assets, equity, and debt).  
This method, in addition to its own relevance, 
has an advantage over the methods used in the 
majority of previously conducted studies of 
allowing the use of consolidated financial 
statements. Both the financial data used and the 
process of defining the control chain are therefore 
public, can be verified objectively and were 
elaborated using converging accounting standards. 
Agency problems could lead to earnings 
management and bias the financial statement 
information, which would certainly have 
implications for results using the earnings data. In 
fact, in accordance with agency theory, when 
managers have control (Berle and Gardiner 1968), 
they seek to maximize their utility by altering 
accounting information in order to expropriate 
owners by earning management. However this is 
typical in Anglo-Saxon capitalism, which is 
characterized by large corporations in which 
ownership is fragmentary, 
Instead, in Renan capitalism (Italy belongs to 
these countries), which is characterized by 
ownership concentration, research suggests that it 
is the majority shareholders who expropriate 
minority shareholders through predatory strategies 
known as tunneling. In this context, by scrutinizing 
management activity, the large block-holders of 
shares seem to inhibit earnings management and 
improve credibility of a firm’s financial statements 
(among others, Dechow et al. 1996, Ghazalat et al. 
2017).  
So, I proceeded to construct a solid 
mathematical model able to relate a group's 
financial structure to its revenue with respect to the 
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various elements contributing resources: majority 
shareholders, minority shareholders, and lenders.  
Furthermore, this model can also be easily 
used for comparisons over time and between other 
groups and firms. 
Then, I applied this model to compare the 
Italian groups and their own holding companies to 
verify the picture offered by previous circumstantial 
research on minority expropriation (predatory view 
and synergic view). 
This approach produced interesting results.  
Contradicting predatory view, the majority, at 
least within the consolidation perimeter, appears 
not to systematically expropriate subsidiaries.  
Minority equities are few (thus, interest in 
expropriating them is minimal), and the majorities 
leave part of their wealth invested in the body of 
their group. 
Minority return on equity is, on average, 
considerably higher than majority return on equity 
and group operating profits.  
Therefore, in summary, if minority shareholder 
equities are few and very well-remunerated, this 
analysis leads us to reject the hypothesis of 
expropriation to the detriment of minority interests. 
However, groups tend to have higher debt 
leverage than single holding companies, which is a 
key element in building profits and retaining 
earnings. These profits and earnings, however, 
remain invested in the subsidiaries.  
I also observed that group and holding interest 
rates are comparable, showing that risk is uniform 
overall and does not support the hypothesis of an 
increased risk to the group with respect to the 
holding. 
Another interesting result is that, on average, 
holdings appear to pay less tax than subsidiaries. 
This could explain the propensity on the part of the 
holdings to create groups. 
This distribution leads us to conclude that the 
group structure, so common in Italy, is not 
motivated by a will to gather resources from 
minority shareholders and is much less the result of 
a desire for large-scale expropriation. I can only 
speculate on other reasons, such as reduction or 
containment of risk of bankruptcy for the entire 
entity or an attempt to optimize dimensions or legal 
firm localization to obtain benefits (e.g., in terms of 
labor relations and taxation).  
The model highlights also an enormous variety 
of combinations in terms of managed resources and 
their remuneration. Hence, there may be different 
situations, both within a single group and between 
groups of groups belonging to business sectors 
(Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984), that can be further 
explored using the proposed model discussed in the 
paper. 
Correlation analyses highlight a close 
relationship between holding company leverage 
ratios, groups and holding company-groups.  
I also observe that, when holdings tend toward 
the form of pure holding companies, they have 
higher leverage (in this case, minorities also seem 
well remunerated) and they seem, on average, to 
dominate relatively larger, richer and more 
profitable groups in comparison to their own 
dimensions; therefore, I can assume pyramidal 
structures. 
Regression analyses confirm the close bond 
between holding company leverage ratios and group 
leverage ratios. Therefore, I conclude that by 
analyzing each holding’s indicator, I can infer the 
corresponding group’s indicator and thus estimate 
possible group leverage. Conversely, these 
indicators confirm that it is difficult to fix precise 
tendencies with respect to the management of 
minorities. This result refutes the hypothesis of 
systematic expropriation. 
Regression analyses also confirm that the 
higher the similarity of a holding is to pure holding 
companies, the greater the use of equity leverage is, 
and the analyses restate the tendency of this type of 
holding to leave more profits and retained earnings 
invested in subsidiaries and to dominate more 
pyramidal capital structures. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Italian legal forms for limited liability companies (“società di capitali”) are arranged as follows:  
 Spa (Società per azioni): Italian limited liability companies whose capital is divided into shares (called 
‘azioni’) and whose members (shareholders) are only liable for its debts within the limits of the capital stock. 
The minimum required starting capital for an S.p.A. is € 120,000. The shares, which can be offered to the 
general public, can be transferred by endorsement or bought and sold on a stock exchange. Only S.p.As can 
be listed on a stock exchange). 
 Srl (Società a responsabilità limitata): an Italian limited liability company whose capital is divided into 
stakes (called ‘quote’) and whose members are only liable for its debts within the limits of the company 
assets. The minimum required starting capital for an S.r.l. is € 10,000. The S.r.l. is the more common type of 
corporation because it can be easier to run; it is characterized by perfect autonomy of the assets, as in an 
S.p.A., but at the same time, its organizational flexibility and the existence of personal stakes (and not 
shares) make it more similar to a partnership. 
Others: I have arranged Sapa (Società in accomandita per azioni), a hybrid form of an Italian company 
(fairly uncommon) partially limited by shares that involve two different categories of shareholders, some 
with and some without limited liability (“accomandanti”, standard shareholders who have limited liability 
when managing shareholders, “accomandatari” shareholders who have full liability); “società cooperative” (or 
‘coop’), a particular Italian business organization owned and run by individuals for their mutual benefit, and 
“società consortili”.  
                                                          
3 () Where “P” is Profit, “I” is Interest expenses, “S” is Extraordinary revenue and expenses, “T” is Tax expenses, “TA” is Total Assets, “D” is Debts, “E” is 
Equity. 
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